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The paper explores the lending behaviour of  financial intermediaries 
over the business cycle in the light of  new theories emphasising agency 
costs.  During a "credit crunch" loans from financial intermediaries are 
unobtainable at any price, so that credit may have a "causal"  role in 
influencing  economic  outcomes  in  the  short run.  Tests  of  this 
phenomenon show that it is not supported by  the Australian data. 
However, while credit may not  "cause"  economic activity it may, 
nevertheless, have useful leading indicator properties.  This is because 
the demand for credit is based on expectations about future demand as 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The  role  of  financial  intermediaries  in  the  economy  is  of  particular 
importance for two reasons - they hold a central position in the payments 
system, and provide credit to borrowers who find it difficult to obtain funds 
in open markets.  Prior to the liberalisation of  financial markets in the early 
1980s, the central role of  banks in issuing liquid liabilities that functioned as 
"money"  ensured that bank deposits and currency had a reasonably close 
relationship with nominal expenditure.  Financial liberalisation, however, 
undermined this role.  New financial products have emerged which are close 
substitutes for money.  In addition, banks have partly moved from their 
traditional deposit base to wholesale markets to finance their lending.'  This 
has led some authors to suggest that credit may be a more useful indicator 
for policy than the monetary aggregates.2 
While financial deregulation has undermined banks'  position as providers of 
"money",  depository institutions continue to play an important role in  the 
provision of  credit to small borrowers. Small, heterogeneous commercial 
borrowers, without the reputations of  larger companies, find it prohibitively 
expensive to borrow directly in open markets.  Similarly, in the housing 
market purchases are primarily financed by household borrowing from 
intermediaries.  In liberalised financial markets since the early 1980s, credit 
is likely to  have become a better leading indicator of  nominal spending. 
Unconstrained by official regulations, borrowing is more likely to be based 
on  expectations  about  future  returns  and on  the  cost  of  borrowing 
influenced by monetary policy.  A  shift in  monetary policy that reduces 
expected  future income and wealth, while  also  increasing the cost  of 
borrowing, affects current decisions about future spending by businesses and 
1  See Blundell-Wignall, Browne and  Manasse (1990) for an empirical investigation of 
these issues in OECD countries. 
See King  (1986), Friedman  (1983), Brunner  and Meltzer (1988), and Bernanke  and 
Blinder (1988). households.  While causation is from monetary policy  to  unobservable 
expected future income, wealth, spending and prices,  it  should first be 
observable in reduced credit demand before, or at least  contemporaneously 
with, the decline in actual spending. Lending may even have a causal impact 
on economic activity, if  independent influences on credit supply imposed by 
financial intermediaries lead to rationing or "credit crunch"  episodes in a 
liberalised financial environment. 
I11  contrast to these predictions, a previous study based on data to 1987 by 
Bullock, Morris and Stevens (1989) found that total credit lagged nominal 
demand. One possible reason for this is that their sample period contained 
relatively few observations from the deregulated environment since 1984. 
As more observations are now available, it is possible to test the extent to 
which the earlier finding may need to be reconsidered. 
In Section 2 factors influencing the supply of  and demand for business credit 
are explained and tested on data from the early 1980s to the end of  1991. 
These provide an explanation for the behaviour of  credit over this period, 
and demonstrate that rationing has not been important.  Simple temporal 
ordering tests are then used to examine whether business credit has become 
a more useful leading indicator of  investment since 1983.  Section 3 re- 
examines the relationship between  total credit and nominal GDP.  The 
apparent importance of  regulations (or their absence) in understanding the 
links between credit and tke economy is discussed in Section 4.  Section 5 
concludes. 
2.  BUSINESS CREDIT AND INVESTMENT 
Investors often do not have sufficient information to assess the riskiness of 
investing in small and medium-sized companies, or such information may be 
too  expensive  to  gather.  Hence many companies find  it prohibitively 
expensive to raise funds in open capital markets by issuing their own debt or 
equity. Financial intermediaries, such as banks, play a key role in providing 
credit to these enterprises over the business cycle.3  They collect savings and 
Banks are also important lenders to  large companies.  But such companies can more 
readily substitute between different sources of  financing in response to relative price 
movements. allocate credit, with lending rates to particular firms reflecting their relative 
riskiness.  Nevertheless,  financial  intermediaries, which  specialise  in 
assessing the potential riskiness of  borrowers, may at times lack information 
to assess risks fully, and may find it in their own interest to ration credit. 
2.1  Loan Supply and Demand with the Possibility of Credit Rationing 
Debt contracts deal in promises to pay interest and repay principal in the 
future.  If the risk associated with any project was known equally by both 
parties, and the borrower's behaviour could be  monitored  perfectly,  the 
issuance of debt would be straightforward.4  In  the  absence  of  official 
regulations, intermediaries would set prices to reflect known risks and 
demand would be equated with supply at that price.  However, the efficient 
allocation of credit via  interest rates presupposes that information about 
borrowers'  projects  is freely available.  In  practice  this is not  the case 
because of the presence of  asymmetric information - borrowers know more 
about the risks associated  with their projects than do banks and have an 
incentive to act in a manner which is not in the interests of the lender.  This 
gives rise to a costly state verification problem as in Townsend (1979,1988). 
Whenever there is  an asymmetry of  information between borrowers and 
lenders, optimal financial  arrangements will  involve deadweight losses 
which are referred to as "agency costs".  These include adverse selection and 
moral  hazard  costs  (see  below), but  also  all  other  transactions  and 
information costs. 
The existence of  agency costs has two related implications for the behaviour 
of  bank lending:  (i) the potential for equilibrium credit  rationing (as in 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)); and (ii) the cyclical movement of  bank lending and 
interest rates.  Both factors may coinbine to accentuate the business cycle. 
-- 
4  This  is  the well-known result  of  the  Modigliani-Miller theorem.  See Modigliani 
and Miller (1958). Considering the first of  these, the interest rate charged by a bank may itself 
influence the riskiness of  the banks' pool of  loans.  As interest rates rise there 
are two effects at work: 
the quality of  the borrower pool declines as prudent investors drop out of 
the loan  market.  The borrowers  who are willing to  pay the higher 
interest rate are those with the riskier projects, with potentially higher 
returns, but they have to repay the loan in fewer states (between "good" 
and "bad"  economic outcomes) of  the world.  That is, adverse selection 
occurs;  or 
borrowers may undertake riskier projects at higher interest rates (with 
potentially higher returns but lower probabilities of  success).  That is, a 
moral hazard problem arises. 
Thus, as contractual interest rates rise, the bank's  expected return on loans 
at first rises.  But beyond some point the deterioration in the borrower pool 
begins to outweigh the direct gains from the higher contractual rates.  This 
also implies that the variance of  loan returns rises with interest rates, as 
default rates increase.  This is illustrated by the backward bending loan 
return frontier in the top section of  Figure 1, where expected returns peak at 
the rate rm, while the variance of  returns (shown along the horizontal axis) 
rises.5  Beyond some interest rate the expected return to the bank  falls 
because anticipated increases in  defaults more than offset any increase in 
interest receipts.  At this point increased loan demand would cause the bank 
to maximise profit by denyng loans to some companies, even though these 
could not be distinguished from firms receiving credit.  Price rationing is 
abandoned in favour of  equilibrium quantity rationing.6 
5  This diagram also  assumes that borrowers  accept a common  loan  size and that 
lenders are unable to distinguish amongst borrowers. 
6  For  credit rationing to be effective in reducing investment, firms must be unable to 
raise  funds in  other  ways,  or  other  sources of  funds must be  less  than  perfect 
substitutes for bank  loans.  That is, firms cannot costlessly offset  a decline in bank 




sm  loan returns 
interest rate The corresponding loan supply curve is shown in the bottom panel of 
Figure 1. The cost of  funds to the bank, if, is a weighted average of  low cost 
deposits and wholesale funds (raised at the riskless market rate i), set by 
monetary policy.  The supply curve is not defined at lending rates below if. 
As the loan rate rises above if supply at first increases.  The supply curve So 
becomes backward-bending at some point, as expected returns diminish. 
The second aspect of  agency costs is their cyclical nature.  They are likely to 
decline when borrowers are more solvent, and rise as solvency declines 
(Bernanke and Gertler (1989)). Solvency is a function of  factor prices and 
profits, which are driven mainly by the business cycle.  Most defaults, for 
example, occur  during economic downturns.  Hence,  agency  costs are 
cyclical, declining in boorris (as borrowers net worth and hence collateral 
rises)  and rising in recessions  (as borrower  net  worth  and collateral 
declines).  Thus a recession would be reflected  in a downward shift and 
flattening out of  the loan return frontier.  That is, at each interest rate the 
expected return to  the bank would be  lower and the variance of  returns 
higher. 
If the portfolio problem faced by the bank is restricted to a choice between 
investing in a low-risk asset at rate i determined by  monetary policy,  or 
lending to a firm, it will wish to be on the optimal frontier.  The efficient 
portfolio frontier faced by  the bank is the line drawn from i to the point on 
the loan return frontier corresponding to the interest rate that equates loan 
supply and demand - for example, initially the frontier is the line from i to 
point B in Figure 1.7 The bank will choose a point on the efficient frontier, 
i.e. a mix of  riskless bonds and loans, such as point A,  where its overall 
portfolio return lies somewhere between i and the expected return on riskier 
loans r1.8 
The optimum frontier  from  the bank's  viewpoint would be  a line from  i  to  the 
point of  tangency on the loan-return frontier.  But if  supply exceeded demand at the 
interest rate corresponding to  this  point, competition would drive interest rates and 
expected returns down to a point like B. 
Note that the loan rate ill corresponding to  the expected return rl, is higher than rl. 
For a more complete derivation of  the efficient portfolio frontier, see Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (1990). Now consider the case in which a downturn in economic activity reduces 
firm profitability and increases agency costs.  The increase in agency costs is 
reflected in the downward shift and flattening of the loan return frontier 
(the broken curve).  At any given interest rate the bank would make less 
funds available - lending standards would be tightened - and the supply 
curve shifts from So to S1.  For  illustrative purposes, assume that loan 
supply is equated to demand at the higher interest rate i2.  Suppose in this 
case that the efficient frontier is the line from i to the point of  tangency at D. 
The higher loan rate enables the bank to achieve the same overall risk- 
return trade-off at point A (where it would hold a greater proportion of  its 
portfolio in bonds and less in  loans, since the latter are now riskier).  The 
margin between the bank loan rate and the risk free rate rises from (il - i) to 
(i2 - i).  The increase in the margin between the loan rate and other market 
rates are risk premia that reflect increased probabilities of  default as the 
economy moves into recession.  While the market for loans is cleared at the 
rate i2 in this example, any further increase in loan demand would lead to a 
state of  excess demand.  This is because at interest rates above i2 the bank's 
loan supply curve becomes backward bending,  and equilibrium  credit 
rationing would come into effect. 
However, rationing may be unlikely in  practice.  In the above analysis, 
rationing requires relatively strong loan demand at a time of  rising agency 
costs.  Since agency costs are cyclical, loan demand is more likely to be very 
weak during recessions when such costs are highest.  The demand curve is 
much more likely  to  move inwards to  a  position  such as Dl  when a 
downturn in activity shifts the supply curve inwards.  But while rationing 
seems implausible in practice, the above analysis did demonstrate that there 
may be  a  cyclical  risk  premium in  the  loan rate, which could serve to 
exacerbate the business cycle.  The econornic cycle affects the net worth and 
hence collateral of  the company sector as a whole.  Default risks that arise 
from the cyclical behaviour of  the aggregate economy cannot be diversified 
away by financial institutions.  As the economy enters a downturn corporate 
net worth falls, raising agency costs and hence the loan rate relative to the 
riskless interest rate.  This reduces investment and magnifies the extent of 
the contraction in activity.  This process is  reversed during an upturn in 
activity. A general specification of  the loan supply function consistent with the above 
discussion may be written as: 
where:  F1',  F2' F3',  F4'  >  0;  F5', F6', F7' < 0. 
The first term states that loan supply depends on the sum of  deposits and the 
book value of  financial institutions'  capital at the beginning of  the period 
Dt-1. The second term, the banking sector share price relative to the market 
average (eb/e)t-l, captures the stockmarket's  assessment of  the relative 
expected profitability  of  banks and other financial intermediaries.  This 
determines the ease with which new capital can be raised to finance loans in 
the forthcoming period.  The third term, Et-], is the market capitalisation of 
corporate equity at the beginning of  the period. This affects the net worth of 
the corporate sector and hence the collateral available to banks - the higher 
is corporate net worth, the more collateral is available, and the more willing 
are banks to extend loans.  The fourth term is the lending rate minus the 
weighted average cost of  funds in the current period (iL  - if)t.  The higher the 
loan rate relative to the cost of  funds, the better is the bank's average profit 
margin, and the more desirable is lending up to the point where the supply 
curve becomes backward bending. 
The above discussion also suggests that during cyclical downturns agency 
costs rise, so that banks increase the loan rate relative to the current market 
interest rate, which is also the marginal cost of  financing new loans.  This 
cyclical risk premium is captured by the lending rate minus the certificate of 
deposit rate (iL  - i)t in the current period.  Such quality spreads have been 
found by Stock and Watson (1989), amongst others, as useful forecasters of 
swings in activity - a rise in the spread leading a downturn in activity.  In 
Australia's case the loan rate minus the CD rate has also led fluctuations in 
the output gap since 1983 (Chart 2). The term is an imperfect measure of  the 
risk premium, however, as it may have been affected by other factors.  For 
example, the higher cost  of  traditional deposits as competition between 
banks has increased might have served to raise the margin between the loan 
rate and the CD rate independently of  cyclical agency costs.  For this reason 
other variables purporting to capture risks relevant for banking were also 
included in the equation. The sixth term is the variance of  bank share prices relative to the market 
average, ot.  Any increase in the variance of  expected returns on a bank's 
loan portfolio (the horizontal axis of  the upper panel of  Figure 1) should 
also be reflected in bank share prices.  The seventh term nt is the expected 
inflation rate.  This is a more forward-looking variable  associated with 
lending risks.  High inflation is likely to be  associated  with asset price 
speculation and the misallocation of  real resources.  It is possible that banks 
may be relatively more cautious lenders, other things being given, in a 
high-inflation environment. 
On the demand side of  the market for loans, debt financing by companies 
depends on expected future investment and relative prices: 
where:  L;,  Li, Li>O  and L;iO 
and ke is future investment demand expected in period t;  iLt is the loan rate 
in period t;  Ept is the cost of  equity finance in period t, proxied by  the 
earnings-to-price ratio;  and rrt is the inflation rate expected in period t. 
It is important that the investment spending variable used in the study of 
business loan demand is a forward-looking expectations series (Laffont and 
Garcia (1977), Sealey (1979)). These are proxied, somewhat imperfectly, by 
the Confederation of  Australian Industry and Westpac Bankng Corporation 
survey series.  Given expected investment, the demand for loans from 
financial  intermediaries also  depends negatively  on  the  lending rate. 
Higher lending rates for a given rate of  inflation cause investment plans to 
be delayed.  Lower lending rates cause them to be brought forward in time. 
This intertemporal substitution is a key  element of  the monetary policy 
transmission  mechanism.  Its  effects  should be  seen first  in observed 
borrowing behaviour, before  actual spending and activity  adjusts (see 
below).  Changes in the earnings-to-price ratio induce substitution effects 
between debt and equity.  A higher ratio is associated with a higher cost of 
equity and substitution towards debt financing.  Finally, the demand for loans depends positively on inflation  expectations (the expected future 
change in the relative price of  goods). 
The above loan supply and demand functions can be estimated with limited 
dependent variables methods, using the likelihood function derived by 
Maddala and Nelson (1974), (see Appendix A for a fd  technical exposition). 
The requirement that the interest rate adjusts to clear the market for loans is 
not imposed.  Instead the loan rate enters as an explanatory variable, but 
instruments are applied to deal with simultaneity between supply, demand 
and  the  price  of  loans  (the instrumental  variables  are  described  in 
Appendix B). Estimation requires the assumption that the observed quantity 
of  loans transacted is the minimum of  supply or demand.  The technique 
permits the probabilities that each observation belongs to the supply or 
demand function  to  be derived, enabling  the parameters of  both  to be 
estimated by maximising the likelihood function.  Because most of the 
variables contain a unit root, the model is estimated in an error-correction 
form, where the lagged-dependent is included.  Data definitions and issues 
are detailed in the Data Appendix. 
2.2  The Behaviour of Business Credit Since the Early 1980s 
The results for the model estimated on monthly data from December 1982 to 
July 1991 are presented in Table 1. All of  the parameters of  loan demand and 
supply have  the  expected  signs  and  appear  to  be  reasonably  well 
determined.9 
The estimated percentage excess of  demand over supply is shown in the top 
panel of  Chart 1. The only evidence of  excess demand, or credit rationing, is 
during the 1983 recession.  At this time the financial system was still in the 
process of  moving from a regulated to a more liberalised state.  To  the 
extent that rationing was present at this time, it was more likely to have 
been  of  a  disequilibrium  variety  related  to  the  remaining  effects of 
regulations.  Interest  ceilings  on bank  deposits were  removed,  credit 
directives ceased by the middle of  1982, and competition for deposits began 
to increase.  This was reflected in a marked rise in the loan rate shown in 
The standard errors calculated by the limited dependent variables method are only a 
guide to significance - see Appendix A. Chart 2A, which was an important factor in the elimination of  any excess 
demand that may have existed before 1984. 
In the deregulated period from early 1984 onwards, there is no evidence of 
excess  demand.  Indeed, estimated  supply has  exceeded  demand on 
occasions by about 1-2 per cent.  Such outcomes are theoretically plausible, 
because loan demand is influenced by the level of  interest rates, whereas 
loan supply depends on interest margins and other factors such as corporate 
net worth, bank profitability, etc.  In terms of  the analysis in Figure 1, if  the 
supply curve was So and the demand curve was Dl, excess supply FG would 
exist at the interest rate if. However, these circumstances do not seem very 
plausible in practice.  As noted earlier, in a cyclical downturn both supply 
and demand functions tend to move inwards, reducing the likelihood of 
excess supply or demand.  Since  the  excess supply finding is  typically 
relatively small, given the standard error of  the model, it is concluded that 
the market for business loans appears to have been broadly in equilibrium 
since 1984. 
The second panel of  Chart 1 shows monthly percentage changes of  business 
credit from December 1982 and the model estimates of  this series.  The 
model appears to  fit the data rather well, as reflected in the  R2 and the 
standard error.  Two broad episodes stand out: 
i)  the rise in business credit growth to monthly rates of  about 2 per cent 
(24 per cent at annual rates) from 1984 to the end of  1988 (though 
somewhat more slowly in 1987); and 
ii)  the marked decline in business lending from early 1989 to  the end of 
1991, when lending growth eventually became negative. TABLE 1:  Limited Dependent Variable Estimates 
of Loan Supply and Demand 
(Sample Period:  December 1982-June 1991;  Monthly Data) 
Demand  supply 
Constant 
Lagged AFI credit to business h Lt-1 
Investment expectations k; 
Overdraft rate iLt 
Inflation expectations nt 
Earnings/price ratio Ept 
Broad money plus capital In Dtml 
Corporate net worth In Et-1 
Relative bank share price 
(q,  /h  dt-1 
Loan rate less weighted cost funds 
(iL-if) 
Loan rate less CD rate (iL-i)t 
Relative bank share price variance 
ot 
Log likelihood  -107.018 
R2 (for min (S, D) vs actual per  0.45 
cent change outcome) 
Standard error of  estimate  0.783 
Note: Details  of  the  estimation  procedure  are  outlined  in  Appendix  A.  The 
current loan  rate is treated  with instrumental variables  since in  principle  it  is 
simultaneously determined with supply and demand.  Details of instruments are 
set out in Appendix B.  Approximate t-statistics  are shown in parenthesis.  Credit, 
broad money and corporate net worth are logged and multiplied by 100. Chart 1A: Excess Demand 
(percentage by which demand exceeds supply) 
Chart 1B: Actual and Modelled Business Credit 
(monthly log changes) 
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Chart 2B:  The Differential Between the Loan Rate and the CD Rate and the 
Output Gap 
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Note:  The output gap is obtained as the difference between the log of  actual 
and smoothed output, where smoothed output is the result. of  applying the 
Hodrick-Prescott  filter to the log of  actual output (see Hodrick and Prescott 
(1980)). In  explaining the rise  in loan  demand in the first episode, investment 
expectations appear to have been important.  Chart 3 shows three-month 
ended growth in AFI credit to  the business sector and the CAI-Westpac 
investment expectations net balance series.  Investment expectations rose 
from 1984 and, while dipping in 1986, remained high until early 1989, when 
they began to decline very steeply.  The model explains the strength of  the 
demand for business credit through 1986, in spite of  weaker investment 
expectations, mainly through its inflation term.  Business borrowing, at the 
time,  was strongly related  to  the  asset  price  speculation and takeover 
activity usually associated with an inflationary environment. 
On the supply side, the interaction between perceived bank profitability and 
the  net worth of  the corporate sector were,  according to  the estimated 
model, important factors.  Chart 4 shows the bank share price relative to the 
All  Ordinaries index,  and the market  capitalisation of  corporate equity. 
Financial liberalisation was associated with a sharp rise in the perceived 
profitability of  banks in the early 1980s, with their share price rising 50 per 
cent relative to the market average.  However, at that time the net worth of 
the corporate sector had not begun to increase significantly, as the economy 
was in recession.  From 1984 corporate net worth did begin to grow rapidly 
and, pen  the perceived profitability of banks, credit supply rose in line with 
increasing demand.  In  1986 and the first half  of  1987, bank share prices 
declined relative  to  the  average, largely in  response  to  tight  monetary 
policy.  In liberalised financial markets higher interest rates increase the 
probability  of  non-performing loans.  Since banks'  balance  sheets are 
directly affected, their share prices tend to be relatively adversely affected 
during such episodes.  However, credit supply continued to grow rapidly 
despite the change in the relative market valuation of  banks.  According to 
the model presented here,  this was due to  the abnormal belraviour  of 
corporate net worth.  From  January 1986  to  October 1987 the  market 
capitalisation of  listed corporate equities grew from $100 billion  to  over 
$300 billion.  This greatly increased the collateral of  the corporate sector, 
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Note:  Investment expectations are measured  as  the net balance of  survey 
respondents who expect their  capital expenditure on buildings, plant and 
machinery to rise over the following twelve months, as reported in the CAI - 
Westpac Survey of  Industrial Trends. 
Chart 4: The Bank Share Price Index Relative to the All Ordinaries and the 
Market Capitalisation of Listed Equities 
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Jan-80  Jan-82  Jan-84  Jan-86  Jan-88  Jan-90 Credit supply remained strong after the stockmarket break in October 1987, 
when  corporate  net  worth  fell  and agency costs  should  have  risen. 
However, banks came back  into relative  favour with  the stockmarket 
throughout the second half  of  1987 and 1988, when there was a marked 
recovery in their average share price compared to the All Ordinaries index. 
The reasons for this improvement in the relative performance of  banks were 
twofold.  First, the favourable effects of  the easing of  monetary policy in 
1987 and, after the stockmarket collapse, the Reserve Bank's announcement 
(in line with similar announcements in other countries) to guarantee the 
liquidity of banks. Second, dividend imputation was introduced in mid 1987. 
This was particularly favourable for banks because most of  their dividends 
are fully franked. The improved market perception of  the economic position 
of  banks, then, helped underpin continued lending to the corporate sector 
during late 1987 and 1988.  Demand remained particularly strcng at this 
time because investment expectations had not been undermined, and the 
stockmarket break greatly increased the cost of  equity finance (proxied in the 
model by the earnings-to-price ratio). 
In the second major episode, business credit began to slow at the end of  1988, 
about one year after the stockmarket crash.  On the demand side this was 
due to high real interest rates (Chart 2A), falling investment expectations 
and eventually declining inflation (Chart 3). On the supply side, corporate 
net worth did not fully recover after the stockmarket crash and, from the 
end of  1988, non-performing loan problems have seen bank share prices 
steadily decline relative to the All Ordinaries, as their profitability has been 
re-assessed.  A credit crunch episode, in the sense of  banks denying loans to 
borrowers regardless of  the price they are prepared to pay for them, was 
not identified for this period, suggesting that the slowdown in credit growth 
was driven by a fall in the demand for loans rather than an excessive fall in 
supply.  However, tougher lending standards operating through the normal 
price mechanism do appear to have been important.  In cyclical downturns it 
is  normal  that  lending rates  sl~ould  rise  relative  to  the  market  rate 
underpinned by monetary policy.  As shown in Chart 2B, the loan rate minus 
the CD rate led the downturn in activity, reflecting to a large extent the 
normal cyclical risk premium discussed earlier. 2.3 The Relationship Between Business Credit and Investment 
The above results suggest that business credit supply and demand have been 
roughly in balance since the end of  1984.  Credit demand was driven by 
expected future investment spending, the earnings-to-equity-price  ratio, 
inflation expectations and the cost of  credit.  Moreover, supply was driven 
in large part by corporate net worth and bank share price behaviour - equity 
prices being determined by expected future returns.  Cyclical risk premium 
were also found to be  important.  In  other words, major influences on 
business  credit  are driven  by  variables  which  are  (i)  dependent  on 
expectations about future activity (share prices, risk prernia), or (ii) influence 
future activity, such as the intertemporal substitution effects induced by 
variations in the loan rate.  In the absence of  constraining regulations, these 
forward-looking influences suggest that business credit, in principle, should 
contain useful information for forecasting future business spending. 
There is a certain cash-in-advance element to investment good purchases. 
Most capital goods, for example are imported, and it is necessary to make a 
succession of  payments from the time orders are placed until the import and 
investment  is recorded  by  the  Statistician.  Domestic orders of  heavy 
machinery are counted as stocks of  work in progress of  the producer. 
Payments again need to be made, but the good is not recorded as investment 
until later.  In liberalised financial markets these payments are more likely to 
be made at the discretion of  companies through borrowing.  Firms are not 
liquidity constrained  in the sense of  being dependent on cash flows or 
liquidity generated by the upswing in the economic cycle itself. 
In a recession lending rates are relatively high due to the previous stance of 
monetary policy  and increased cyclical risk premia, while cash flow is 
relatively poor. As it becomes clear the economy will recover, risk prernia in 
lending rates begin to decline and asset values (and hence collateral begin to 
rise). At these times borrowing may be important in financing stock building 
and working capital in the initial stages of  recovery.  As the recovery gets 
under  way  and  sales  pick  up,  cash  flow  improves  providing  a 
contemporaneous accelerator boost to business investment later on.  But in 
the  initial  stages  of  the  recovery  access  to  credit  from  financial 
intermediaries  may  play  a  pivotal  role  in  financing  investment  in 
deregulated markets. Conversely, at the top of  the economic cycle a tightening of  policy reduces 
expectations about future activity and profits, while increasing the cost of 
borrowing,  Increased cyclical risk premia exacerbate the rise in the cost of 
credit and asset values fall.  This leads to substitution towards internal 
sources of  funds and reduced overall expenditure in the downswing phase. 
These factors ensure that the downswing will be contemporaneous with or 
led by a marked fall in borrowing from financial intermediaries. 
Chart 5 shows 12-month-ended and 3-month-ended percentage changes in 
business credit and the  12-month-ended percentage  change in business 
investment.  The decline in growth of  business credit in response to tight 
monetary policy in the late 1980s led the decline in investment by about one 
year. 
The usefulness of  business credit as a leading indicator  of  investment 
suggested by the above analysis may be  tested  explicitly.  To  do this, 
cointegration tests between the logarithm of  business credit, the logarithm 
of  nominal investment and the level of  the loan rate were conducted to see 
whether there was a long-run equilibrium relationship be tween them.10  The 
results (not reported) were decisively negative.  This suggested that vector 
autoregression  techniques  were  appropriate  for  testing  the  leading 
indicator properties of  the changes in these series vis-a-vis each other.  The 
results are set out in Table 2, using quarterly data over two sample periods: 
1984Q1 to 1991Q2, when financial markets were fully deregulated and the 
loan market was not in a state of  excess demand;  and the full sample period 
1977Q3 to 1991Q2. The null hypothesis is that the sums of  the coefficients on 
the explanatory variables are zero.  The table shows the estimated sum of 
the  coefficients on the lagged  variables and levels of  significance of the 
F-statistics  relating  to  the  test  of  the  null.  The  second  statistics  in 
parentheses are levels of  significance for the test of  the hypothesis that the 
coefficients on the lagged explanatory variables are jointly equal to zero. 
lo Business credit and investment appear to be integrated of  order one.  The loan rate 
appears to be stationary.  Since the  VAR results discussed below  concern short-run 
changes in the logarithms of  nominal investment and GDP, and since price deflators 
are  relatively  inert,  most  of  the  variation  in  these  variables  over  the  short-run 
concern real magnitudes. The results suggest some differences between the two sample periods.  Over 
the full sample period investment appears to be a useful leading indicator of 
business credit.  There is also some weaker evidence that business credit has 
useful information for forecasting changes in investment.  However, if  the 
sample is restricted to the shorter period of  liberalised financial markets 
(and no excess demand), nominal investment no longer leads business credit. 
Instead, business credit becomes a very strong leading indicator for nominal 
investment.  These findings are consistent with the view that during the 
1980s loan supply and demand have come to be driven by more forward- 
looking variables, as financial markets have been liberalised. Chart  5A: Nominal Investment and All Financial Intermediariesf Lending to 
Business 
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Overdraft Rate 
Business  Nominal  Overdraft 
Credit  Investment  Rate 
Sample Period:  1984Q1-1991Q2 
(Quarterly Data Lags = 3) 
Dependent Variables 
Business  0.761  0.243  -0.001 
Credit  (O.OO)**  (O.OO)**  (0.17)  (0.50)  (0.49)  (0.41) 
Nominal  1.766  -0.165  -0.005 
Investment  (O.OO)** (O.OO)**  (0.69)  (0.88)  (0.16)  (0.18) 
Overdraft  3.549  9.582  0.815 
Rate  (0.81)  (0.95)  (0.43)  (0.72)  (O.OO)** (O.OO)** 
Sample Period:  1977Q3-1991Q2 
(Quarterly Data Lags = 3) 
Business  0.758  0.212  -0.000 
Credit  (O.OO)** (O.OO)**  (0.01)**  (0.03)*  (0.81)  (0.24) 
Nominal  1.097  0.138  -0.006 
Investment  (0.01)**  (0.07)  (0.60)  (0.84)  (0.02)*  (0.02)* 
Overdraft  12.501  5.291  0.934 
Rate  (0.13)  (0.33)  (0.30)  (0.69)  (O.OO)**  (O.OO)** 
Note: Business  credit and nominal investment are in quarterly percentage changes. 
The overdraft rate is a quarterly average (in levels).  The table shows the sum of  the 
co-efficients on the lagged variables.  The first figure in parenthesis is the significance 
of the F-statistic for the test of  the null hypothesis that sum of  the co-efficients is 
zero.  The second figure in parenthesis is the level of  significance of  the F-statistic for 
the null hypothesis that  the co-efficients on the  lagged  variables all  equal zero. 
Significant F-statistics  indicate  rejection  of  the  null  hypothesis.  Two  asterisks 
denotes significance at the 1 per cent level.  One asterisk denotes significance at the 
5 per cent level.  All variables are defined in the Data Appendix. 3.  TOTAL AFI CREDIT AND GDP 
The study by Bullock, Morris and Stevens (1989) found that all financial 
intermediaries  (AFI)  credit unambiguously lagged  GDP  growth.  This 
finding was based on data to the end of 1987, and was therefore dominated 
by the regulated period.  Total AFI credit consists of  the business loans 
analysed in Section 2, housing loans and personal loans.  However, the bulk 
of  AFI  credit  is  made  up of  lending  to  the  business  sector.  The 
forward-looking  variables and intertemporal substitution  mechanisms 
influencing business credit are also relevant  for forecasting the  level of 
economic activity itself, and not just investment.  Expectations about future 
activity are, after all, a key influence on investment decisions.  In any case, 
turning points in business investment and GDP are often in line with each 
other  (see  Chart 7), and business  credit  was shown  to  lead business 
investment.  For these reasons it might be useful to see whether more recent 
data has improved the indicator value of  AFI credit with respect to GDP. 
Chart 6 shows 12-month-ended percentage changes in AFI credit compared 
to nominal GDP in the top panel, and 3-month-ended percentage changes in 
credit in the bottom panel.  Credit appears to have lagged GDP for all of  the 
period prior to 1984Q1. The subsequent sustained strength of  credit growth 
from 1984 to 1986 was driven by business credit.  This grew strongly with 
investment in 1984 and 1985, and did not follow the downturn in GDP in the 
latter year.  Business credit also grew strongly in 1986, even though GDP 
and investment growth declined. There was, then, some decoupling of  AFI 
credit from the GDP cycle ir~  these years, largely because of  the behaviour of 
the business sector in the newly-deregulated financial system. Chart 6A: All Financial Institutions Credit and Total GDP 
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-1  0  -10 However, from late 1988, following a period of  very rapid growth, credit 
began to slow continually until the end of  1991. The downturn in credit led 
that of  GDP by about one year.  The timing of the turnaround in quarterly 
credit growth was even earlier than this, being superficially related to the 
spike in borrowing immediately after the stockmarket break.  But even if 
monthly growth rates between December 1987 and April 1988 are assumed 
to be the same as the average monthly growth rates for the twelve months 
ending in November 1987, the timing of  the turnaround in 12-month-ended 
credit growth is not significantly affected (shaded lines in the two panels of 
Chart 6). Whichever way it is measured, the timing of  the downturn in 
annual credit growth in the late 1980s significantly precedes that for GDP. 
To examine these relationships more formally, total credit, GDP and the 
loan rate are first tested for cointegration.  The left panel of  Table 3 shows 
results for the full sample period 1976Q1 to 1991Q4.  The right panel shows 
results for the same shorter sample period used for business credit and 
investment.  Each  of  the  variables  individually  was  found  to  be 
non-stationary (integrated of  order one or two), a pre-condition for testing 
for cointegration.11  Details of  how the tests were conducted are set out in 
the  note  to  Table  3.  The  left  hand  column  of  each  panel  shows the 
cointegrating regression, Augmented Dickey Fuller  (ADF) and Phillips- 
Perron (2)  statistics. 
Results for the longer sample period are focused upon first.  These suggest 
that credit, GDP and the loan rate are cointegrated at the 10 per cent level 
using the ADF statistic, and at the 5 per cent level using the Z statistic. 
The shortness of  the sample period is such that the cointegration results are 
unlikely  to be very robust.  Nevertheless,  the  finding of  any long-run 
relationship  between  these  three  variables  suggests that  the  temporal 
ordering (or "causality") tests should at least  be  conducted in an error 
correction  (as opposed  to  VAR)  framework.  The  error  correction 
regressions  with  GDP,  credit  and  the  loan  rate,  respectively,  as  the 
dependent variables, are shown in the second, third and fourth columns of 
"  Most of the variables are integrated  of  order one.  Nominal credit  is  ambiguous 
being either I(1) or I(2).  Tests of  the order of  integration for each series are presented 
in Appendix C. Table 3. The significance of the parameter on the residual from the long-run 
levels relationship in each of  these cases suggest that: 
nominal credit adjusts to previous movements in the levels of  nominal 
GDP and the loan rate; 
the loan rate also adjusts to prior movements of  GDP and credit; but 
nominal GDP is not led by prior movements in the levels of  nominal 
credit and the loan rate. 
That is, the nominal activity variable appears to be weakly exogenous and 
leads the credit and loan rate variables, both of  which are endogenous. This 
finding is entirely consistent with that of  Bullock, Morris and Stevens. 
The results for the shorter sample period shown in the second panel again 
suggest cointegration, this time at the 5 per cent level for both the ADF and 
Phillips-Peron statistics.  The error correction results suggest a number of 
important differences compared to the results for the longer sample period. 
With credit as the dependent variable the parameter on the residual from 
the levels relationship -0.292, or speed of  adjustment, is highly significant 
and much stronger compared to the long sample period results.  It implies 
5 
adjustment to the long-run equilibrium relationship of  31  quarters.  This 
compares with a speed of  adjustment of  -0.066, or 15 quarters, if  data from 
the regulated period is included.  Credit still adjusts to prior movements in 
the loan rate and GDP, but much more rapidly than for the full sample 
period.  With GDP as the dependent variable, the weak exogeneity finding 
over the full sample period is no longer supported by the data.  Nominal 
GDP also adjusts endogenously to prior movements in the levels of  credit 
and the loan rate over the period 1984Q1 to 1991Q4. 
Both credit and GDP, therefore, appear to be  useful for forecasting each 
other, when used in conjunction with the lending rate.  Only the loan rate 
appears to be weakly exogenous over the shorter sample period (the final 
column of  Table 3).  The finding of  two-way causation between GDP and 
credit since 1984 contrasts with that of  Bullock, Morris and Stevens, who 






TABLE 3:  GDP, Credit and the Lending Rate 
Cointegration and Error Correction Results 
Dependent Variables 
(1976Q1-1991Q4) 
1nC  AlnC  AlnY  Ai 
-4.600  0.000  0.016  -1.110 
(0.2)  (3.8)  (2.2) 
1.521  -  -  - 
-0.009  -  -  - 
-  -0.066  -0.020  -0.572 
(3.7)  (0.6)  (6.8) 
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Table 3 continues on the next page. TABLE 3 CONTINUED: GDP, Credit and the Lending Rate 
Cointegration and Error Correction Results 
Note:  The Augmented Dickey Fuller  (ADF) tests (with the null of  a unit root) are 
performed on each model, allowing for trend and/or drift terms, if  relevant.  TWO 
asterisks denotes that the null of  no cointegration can be  rejected  at the 5 per cent 
level.  One asterisk denotes rejection  at the 10 per cent level.  The Z test is the test 
proposed in Phillips (1987).  This test involves making non-parametric adjustments to 
the ADF test.  All standard errors in the error correction regressions are White (1980) - 




1nC  AlnC  AlnY  Ai 
-  0.008  -  0.270 
(8.0)  (2.0) 
-  -  -  - 
-  -  -  - 
-  -  -  - 
-  -  -  - 
-  -0.003  -  - 
(4.5) 
-2.19**  -  -  - 
-2.08**  -  - 
-  0.95  0.60  0.38 














1nC  AlnC  AlnY  Ai 
-  -0.005  -  0.704 
(5.8)  (5.4) 
-  0.004  -  - 
(3.2) 
-  -  -  0.259 
(2.6) 
-  -  -  0.327 
(4.0) 
-  -  -  - 
-  -0.002  -  0.280 
(3.8)  (2.5) 
-1.72*  -  -  - 
-2.17**  -  -  - 
-  0.88  0.13  0.62 
-  2.4  1.6  2.1 4.  CREDIT AND THE ECONOMY 
The above findings suggest the leading indicator properties of  business and 
total credit improved vis-a-vis both activity variables (investment and GDP) 
over the period in which financial markets have been fully liberalised.  Prior 
to 1984 peaks and troughs in business and total credit always lagged behind 
peaks and troughs of  the activity variable.  A possible reason for this is that 
in regulated financial markets, which include the presence of  deposit rate 
ceilings  and foreign exchange controls, financial intermediaries cannot 
finance any demand for credit based  on private sector plans for future 
expenditure.  Instead, the bulk of  lending is financed from "core" deposits. 
Banks are unable to bid directly for funds, and must depend upon growth in 
national saving to fund the demand for loans, once private sector holdings 
of  financial assets other than deposits with financial intermediaries have 
been determined. Since saving is positively related to income, movements in 
GDP are more likely to precede movements in loans financed from deposits 
during periods affected by financial regulations.  Credit is able to play a 
more important role in financing expenditure only when rising  current 
income has in any case reduced liquidity constraints in the economy. 
In liberalised  financial markets liquidity constraints are greatly reduced. 
Lending is no longer constrained by national saving, as international capital 
flows can more easily adjust to ensure differences between national saving 
and investment are financed. In this environment credit is determined by the 
forward-looking  supply and  demand  factors  described  in  Section  2. 
Financial institutions are able to respond more quickly to loan demand, 
given market factors influencing supply.  Credit is always available at a 
price.  Financial intermediaries manage their liabilities, simply buying any 
additional deposits they need to finance lending in wholesale markets, either 
in the domestic economy or abroad. 
The implications of  this change in environment for the behaviour of  credit in 
relation to the economy appear to be quite strong.  Where business credit 
and investment had a two-way causal relationship over the full sample 
period,  business  credit  has  unambiguously  led  investment  since 
deregulation.  Eliminating observations from the regulated period also sees 
total credit providing some useful leading information about GDP.  While 
GDP also leads credit, so that two-way causation is present, the speed of adjustment of  total credit consequent upon prior movements in GDP and 
interest rates is increased. 
It is still too early to conclude that these results will prove robust for future 
turning points in the economic cycle.  Moreover, the presence of  two-way 
causation suggests that any leading indicator properties of  credit  with 
respect to the overall level of  activity will always need to be assessed in the 
light of  other developments in the economy.  Nevertheless, it is interesting 
to note that similar findings concerning the improved indicator qualities of 
credit have been found for the US economy.  For example, Bernanke and 
Blinder (1988) found that credit had a much more reliable relationship with 
economic activity in the 1979 to  1985 period, compared to money, than 
during the 1974 to 1979 period, when money had a stronger relationship. 
More recently, O'Brien and Browne (1992), in an OECD study, showed that 
the leading indicator properties of  credit in  the United  States greatly 
improved over the 1983Q1 to 1991Q2 period, compared to an earlier sample 
period of  1970Q1 to 1982Q4.  Okina (1992) has shown that, in the case of 
Japan, broad definitions of  credit have remained good leading indicators of 
inflation in the 1980s and early 1990s, compared to money supply variables 
which are now less useful for forecasting. 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has sought to examine the role of  credit in the economy, taking 
account  of  new  theories  that  emphasise the  potential  importance  of 
informational problems that  financial  intermediaries need  to overcome 
when operating in liberalised markets.  These information problems may 
result in loan rationing, which would impart a causal relation between 
credit and subsequent developments in economic activity.  However, such 
credit rationing effects were found to be absent when supply and demand 
functions were estimated for business loans over the period of  financial 
liberalisation in Australia.  Risks concerning the solvency of  corporate clients 
appear to  have been  reflected  in normal  variations in the risk  premia 
component of  lending rates over the business cycle, rather than by rationing 
as such. The estimated business loan supply and demand equations highlight the 
influence  of  forward-looking variables.  Demand  was  influenced  by 
investment  expectations,  inflation  expectations  and  the 
earnings-to-equity-price ratio.  Supply was affected by corporate net worth, 
cyclical risk premia, and bank share price behaviour.  All of  these variables 
are influenced by expectations about future activity.  Furthermore, business 
and total credit were both shown to be influenced by the loan rate, which is a 
key aspect of  the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Over the period 
of  liberalised financial markets all of  these factors should impart some 
leading indicator (though not necessarily "causal") role to the behaviour of 
business and total credit. 
This was confirmed with formal tests which analyse the temporal ordering 
of  variables.  Business credit has been an unambiguous leading indicator of 
investment since 1984, whereas two-way causation is present if  data from 
the regulated era are included.  The leading indicator properties of  total 
credit vis-a-vis GDP also improved somewhat.  If  data from the regulated 
period were included in the tests, total credit was found to have no leading 
indicator role for GDP.  For the period 1984 Q1 to 1991 Q4, however, total 
credit  has a  two-way relationship with GDP.  There is information  in 
current GDP growth useful for forecasting future credit  growth, but  at 
times credit may also have some information useful for forecasting GDP. 
It seems likely that the role of  credit as an indicator in an economy with 
liberalised  financial  markets may  be  different  to its role  in a regulated 
environment.  When regulations are binding, banks are more dependent on 
their  "core"  deposits  to  finance  their  lending.  "Core"  deposits  are 
accumulated in large part through saving from income, making it likely that 
GDP will have a tendency to lead credit.  In liberalised markets the relative 
importance of  core deposits in financing lending is greatly reduced, as 
fmancial institutions are able to manage their liabilities, essentially buying in 
wholesale markets at  home or abroad  any deposits needed  to finance 
lending.  Hence, to the extent that credit is determined by forward-looking 
variables, it is now somewhat more likely to provide leading information 
about the economic cycle than in the past. However, experience suggests that the leading indicator properties of  credit 
will nevertheless always need to  be assessed with caution,  taking  due 
account of  other relevant developments in the economy. APPENDIX A:  MAXIMUM - LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION OF THE 
DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF BUSINESS CREDIT 
1.  The Likelihood Function 
The model that we estimate is: 
where Dt denotes the quantity demanded during period t,  St the quantity 
supplied during period t,  XD~  and Xst denote the exogenous variables that 
influence  Dt and St respectively, and u~t  and ust are the residuals.  It is 
assumed that the observed quantity of  loans transacted is the minimum of 
demand and supply. That is, as in any market with voluntary exchange, the 
short side of  the market must prevail.  Thus, let Qt be the actual quantity 
observed during period t: 
Qt  = min (Dt, St) 
Maddala and Nelson (1974) derive the likelihood function for this model 
using limited - dependent variable methods. 
The probability that the observation Qt belongs to the demand equation is 
given by: 
nt = pro  < St) 
= pr (P'D~D~  + u~t  < P'sxst + ust) 
= pr (u~t  - ust < P'sxst - P'DXD~) 
It is assumed that UD and us are independently and normally distributed, 
with variances oh and o:  respectively  (and  that  they  are also serially 
independent).  Therefore,  UD - us is normally distributed with variance 
o* =.a  + 0s. Hence, 
Now define, 
1  1 
fs(Qt)  = d-  e*p [ - 7  (Qt  - P's - P'SXS~)~  2x0s  2"s  1 
Then, given that Qt belongs to the demand equation, the conditional density 
of  Qt is gven  by: 
The denominator of  this is equal to pr(Dt < St) and, hence, is equal to xt. 
Thus this can be written as: Similarly, the conditional density of Qt  given that Qt belongs to the supply 
equation, is written as: 
Since Qt lies on the demand equation with probability nt and on the supply 
equation with probability (1 - nt), the unconditional density of  Qt (given the 
observed values of the exogenous variables XD~,  Xst) is as follows: 
Hence, the log - likelihood, L,  may be written as: 
where n is the number of  observations. 
2.  The Estimation Method: Discussion 
Parameter estimates were obtained by maximising the log - likelihood using 
the  Broydon,  Fletcher,  Goldfarb  and  Shanno  (BFGS)  maximisation 
algorithm  (which is  a  modification  of  the  Davidon,  Fletcher,  Powell 
method). 
A number of  caveats are in order when estimating models with unknown 
sample separation.  Firstly, a conceptual problem arises in that too much 
may be asked of  the data when it is not known which observations are on the 
demand function and which  are on the supply function.  Monte Carlo 
methods find  that  there  is  considerable  loss  of  information if sample 
separation is not known.  However, empirical results obtained by some 
other studies using this method are quite good (Maddala (1983) p 299). Secondly, it can be shown that  the likelihood function for this model is 
unbounded for certain parameter values.  However, it has been shown that 
even if  the likelihood function diverges, a consistent estimate of  the true 
parameter value in this model corresponds to a local maximum of  the 
likelihood function, rather than a global maximum.  Thus the fact that a 
local maximum is obtained rather than a global maximum is not a matter of 
concern, but this result does not ensure that the particular local maximum 
we  have located  will  give  a consistent  estimate of  the  true parameter 
values. 
Finally,  the  estimate  of  the  covariance  matrix  produced by  the  BFGS 
method may not be precise.  The estimated covariance matrix from the 
BFGS algorithm is (for a well - behaved function) approximately -H, where 
H is the Hessian of  the objective function L.  The only exact result that holds 
for the BFGS method is that if  L is quadratic with K free parameters, then 
after K or more iterations the estimated covariance matrix will be  exactly 
-H  (Doan  (1988).  However,  the  log-likelihood  from  our  model  is 
considerably more complex than a quadratic function, hence standard errors 
reported in this paper should be interpreted as a guide to significance, rather 
than as a precise measure of  significance. 38 
APPENDIX B:  THE LOAN RATE AND INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
Three interest rate variables are treated as being simultaneously determined 
with the observed quantity of  credit: the loan rate itself, the spread between 
the loan rate and the certificate of  deposit rate, and the spread between the 
loan rate and the weighted cost of  funds. 
The instruments applied to each of  these variables is as follows. 
The loan rate: 
lags of  the loan rate; 
expected inflation; 
the 90 day bank bill rate; 
the previous period's non farm GDP; 
the spread between the mortgage rate and the thirteen week Treasury 
note rate; 
the previous period's broad money; 
the rediscount rate for Treasury notes; 
the current and lagged issue yleld on thirteen week Treasury notes; 
all banks1  capital; 
a time trend. 
The spread between the loan rate and other interest rates: 
the maximum rate on certificates of  deposit; 
the rediscount rate for Treasury notes; 
the spread between  the mortgage rate and the thirteen week Treasury 
note rate; 
the previous period's broad money; 
the previous period's issue yield on thirteen week Treasury notes; 
the previous period's loan rate; 
all banks' capital; 
the monthly change in non farm GDP. Instrumental variables were also applied to the earnings price ratio.  The 
instruments were: 
the maximum rate on certificates of  deposit; 
the rediscount rate for Treasury notes; 
the spread between the mortgage rate and the thirteen week Treasury 
note rate; 
the previous period's broad money; 
the previous period's issue yield on thirteen week Treasury notes; 
the previous period's loan rate; 
all banks' capital; 
the monthly change in non farm GDP; 
corporate net worth. APPENDIX C:  ORDER OF INTEGRATION TESTS 
The  following  tables  contain  the  results  of  testing  for the  order  of 
integration of  each variable.  A variable is said to be integrated of  order j if, 
after  differenceing  j  times,  the  variable  is  stationary.  Two  tests  of 
stationarity are reported - the ADF test and the Z test. 
The ADF test is the Augmented Dickey Fuller test.  The following regression 
is estimated: 
where k is the  number of  lags in  the  autocorrelation correction.  The 
significance of  the constant (a)  and the time trend (6)  is tested by comparing 
their  t-statistics with the critical values presented  in  Dickey and Fuller 
(1981).  If  appropriate, either or both of  these variables are eliminated and 
the regression is re-estimated.  The t-statistic on P is then compared with the 
critical values given by Fuller (1976) . 
Z is the test proposed in Phillips (1987).  This test involves making non 
parametric adjustments to the ADF test.  For both tests a significant result 
indicates stationarity. 
Sample Period:  December 1982 -June 1991; Monthly Data 
Autocorrelation Correction = 12  Lags 
Constant  Trend  ADF  Z 
Level of: 
Overdraft Rate  3.709*  0.624  -3.703*  -2.439* 
(Log of) Business Credit  2.629*  -1.61  -2.621  -2,331* 
Expected Inflation  1.752  -0.249  -0.953  -1.898 
Expected Investment  -0.897  -0.357  -1.676  -1.339 
* denotes significance at the 5 % level 
** denotes significance at the 10 % level Sample Period: December 1982  - June 1991;  Monthly Data 
Autocorrelation Correction = 12  Lags 
Constant Trend  ADF  Z 
Level of: 
Price-Earnings Ratio  1.86  -1.0167  -0.31  -2.133 
Differential between the Loan  2.24""  -1.49  -2.254  -2.393 * 
Rate and the Weighted Cost of 
Funds 
(Log of) Corporate Net Worth  1.535  0.115  1.416  -1.703 
Banks' Share Prices  1.84  0.467  -0.902  -1.877 
(Log of) Broad Money plus  1.417  2.132  0.433  -1.296 
Banks'  Capital 
Differential between the Loan  -1.658  3.232"  -2.945  -5.068" 
Rate and the CD Rate 
Differential between the Loan  1.993  -1.77  -0.918  -2.079 
Rate and the Mortgage Rate 
Relative Bank Share Price  1.895  0.76  -0.246  -1.108 
Variance 
First Difference of: 
Overdraft Rate 




Differential between the Loan 
Rate and the Weighted Cost of 
Funds 
(Log of) Corporate Net Worth 
Banks' Share Prices 
(Log of) Broad Money plus 
Banks'  Capital 
Differential between the Loan 
Rate and the CD Rate 
* denotes significance at the 5 % level 
** denotes significance at the 10 % level Sample Period:  December 1982  - June 1991;  Monthly Data 
Autocorrelation Correction = 12  Lags 
Constant  Trend  ADF  Z 
First difference of: 
Differential between the Loan  -0.055  -0.436  -2.231*  -6.664* 
Rate and the Mortgage Rate 
Relative Bank Share Price  0.2  0.643  -2.112*  -2.721* 
Variance 
Second Difference of: 
(Log of) Business Credit  2.646  -2.712**  -3.726*  -44.797* 
(Log of) Broad Money plus  -0.704  -1.293  -3.709*  -23.242* 
Banks'  Capital 
Sample Period:  December 1976  - December 1991;  Quarterly Data 
Autocorrelation Correction = 5 Lags 
Constant  Trend  ADF  Z 
Level of: 
(Log of) Business Credit  1.997  2.3301  -2.338*  0.211 
(Log of) AFI Credit  1.503  2.449**  -0.146  0.794 
(Log of) Nominal Investment  1.702  1.806  -0.692  -1.390 
(Log of) Total GDP  1.698  2.241  0.857  0.039 
The Loan Rate  3.947*  1.955  -3.357*  - - 
First Difference of: 
(Log of) Business Credit 
(Log of)  AFI Credit 
(Log of) Nominal Investment 
(Log of) Total GDP 
The Loan Rate 
* denotes significance at the 5 % level 
** denotes significance at the 10 % level Sample Period: December 1976 - December 1991; Quarterly Data 
Autocorrelation Correction = 5 Lags 
Constant  Trend  ADF  Z 
Second Difference of: 
(Log of)  Business Credit 
(Log of)  AFI Credit 
(Log of)  Nominal Investment 
(Log of)  Total GDP 
* denotes significance at the 5 % level 
** denotes significance at the 10 % level DATA APPENDIX 
Lending to Business  - RBA  Bulletin, Table  D.4,  Credit by  all financial 
intermediaries  -  other  (mainly  business).  This  data  is  adjusted  for 
seasonality and breaks in the series resulting from changes in reporting 
forms, conversion of  building societies to banks and the like. 
Total  AFI  Credit  -  RBA  Bulletin,  Table  D.4  Credit  by  all  financial 
intermediaries -  total (seasonally adjusted). 
Broad Money (seasonally ad.justed) - RBA  Bulletin, Table D.1, 
Bank Capital - All banks' assets less all banks' liabilities, RBA  Bulletin Table 
Bl. 
The Loan  Rate  - RBA  Bulletin, Table F.3, Overdrafts $100 000  and over 
(maximum). 
Weighted Cost of  Funds - Calculated using RBA  Bulletin data and internal 
RBA  data.  See Lowe and Rohling (1992). 
The Mortgage Rate - RBA  Bulletin, Table F.3, Housing loans to individuals 
for owner-occupation. 
The  Rediscount  Rate  for  Treasury  Notes  -  RBA  Bulletin,  Table  F.1, 
Rediscount rate. 
The Certificate of  Deposit Rate - RBA  Bulletin, Table F.3, Weighted average 
issue yleld. 
The Treasury Note Rate - RBA  Bulletin, Table F.1, Issue yield on 13 week 
Treasury notes. 
The Bill Rate - RBA  Bulletin, Table F.1, Bank accepted bills, 90 days. 
All Ordinaries Share Price Index - RBA  Bulletin, Table F.5. Banks Share Prices - Banks/Finance  Share Price Index -- RBA  Bulletin, 
Table F.5. 
Relative Bank Share Price Variance - The ratio of  the standard deviation 
(taken over the past two years observations) of  the Banks/Finance  Share 
Price Index and the standard deviation of  the All Ordinaries Share Price 
Index. 
Corporate Net Worth - RBA  Bulletin, Table F.5, Market capitalisation of 
listed equities at end of  month. 
The earnings/price  ratio -  Monthly Index  Analysis,  Australian  Stock 
Exchange.  The ratio is adjusted by expected output growth to obtain a 
measure of  the true cost of  equity finance.  Expected output growth is 
proxied by the rate predicted by a thirteenth-order  autoregressive model. 
See Richards (1991). 
Expected Investment - Confederation of  Australian Industry and Westpac 
Banking Corporation Survey of  Industrial Trends.  Net balance of  survey 
respondents expecting to increase capital expenditure (plant and machinery 
and buildings) in the next  12 months.  Quarterly data interpolated to 
monthly data by fitting a straight line between each quarterly observation. 
Inflation - expected inflation based on the Total Consumer Price  Index 
(monthly figures obtained by  interpolating quarterly data, assuming the 
growth rate of  prices during each quarter is constant).  Expected inflation is 
calculated as the rate predicted by an eighth order autoregressive model. 
Activity - Non-Farm GDP (Seasonally Adjusted) -- RBA Bulletin, Table G.5. 
Nominal Investment - Business Fixed Investment (Seasonally Adjusted) -- 
RBA  Bulletin, Table G.5. 
Monthly figures for activity were obtained by interpolating quarterly data, 
assuming  that  growth  is  constant  throughout  each  quarter,  and 
constraining the sum of  the three months' activity (investment) in  each 
quarter to be equal to the total quarter's activity (investment). REFERENCES 
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